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INTRODUCTION
Commentators and courts agree on the need for greater control
over the use of expert testimony in the courtroom.' Federal courts
1 Most recently, the cry has been heard from two quarters: Vice President
Quayle's civil-justice reform proposals (proposed by the President's Council on Com-
petitiveness, which he chairs), see Diana C. Bork, Reasonable Legal Reform, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
30, 1991, at 17, and the publications of members of the Manhattan Institute. See PETER
W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); WALTER K.
350
19921 NOTE-EXPERT WITNESS
express particular concern about scientific expert testimony in mass
OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 152-66 (1991); Peter Huber,Junk Science in the Court-
room, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68; see also Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and
Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARx. L. REv. 629, 653 (1991) ("On balance,
[Huber's] analysis and proposals .... while interesting and timely, are ideologically-
driven, unbalanced, and unpersuasive.");Jack H. Olender, People Who Get Injured Unjustly
Deserve Compensation, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at B2 (letter to the editor) ("Huber
and the Manhattan Institute have succeeded in launching another propaganda piece in
their ongoing campaign to subvert the American civil justice system."). Olson's book
was cited favorably by Vice President Quayle in the speech to the American Bar Associa-
tion in which he introduced his reform proposals. See "Isn't Our Legal System in Need of
Reform?", LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 9.
Vice President Quayle specifically proposed "[c]hanging the rules on expert evi-
dence." Id. at 10. The Council "recommend[s] that expert testimony be admissible
only as far as it relates to a community of opinion or scientific thought," because "it is
time to reject the notion that 'junk science' is truly relevant evidence." Id.
Though these recent critics of the courts' handling of expert testimony are perhaps
the most histrionic, they are far from alone. Courts and dommentators have decried the
present system for the past several years. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("I prefer to
examine this case en banc because the panel's opinion shies from a direct confrontation
with one of the more vexing problems currently facing the federal courts-the role of
experts."), denying reh'g of 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1511
(1990); Chaulk by Murphy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.) ("'There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that
cannot now be proved by some so-called "experts .... (quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899))); In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d
1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Our message to our able trial colleagues: it is time to take
hold of expert testimony in federal trials."); REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING
GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN
INSURANCE AvAILABILrrY AND AFFORDABILITY 35 (Feb. 1986) ("It has become all too com-
mon for 'experts' or 'studies' on the fringe of or even well beyond the outer parameters
of mainstream scientific or medical views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from
which conclusions may be drawn.");Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State
and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 738-41 (1989) [hereinafter Judges' Opinions] (Survey evidence indicates that
21 % of federal judges think "the rules relating to the qualifications and use of expert
witnesses ...should be made more restrictive." In complex cases (including toxic
torts), 33% of the federal judges favor making special rules as to who is qualified to
testify, while 32% favor special rules as to what evidence-for example, what statistical
evidence-is acceptable.); Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Associa-
tion, Rulesfor Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 141 (1987) (According to a
straw poll, slightly less than half of those attending this symposium thought the federal
rules should be amended to provide for greater screening of scientific expert testi-
mony.); see also Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115
F.R.D. 89, 91 (1987) ("It is quite apparent that experts are readily available to present
essentially frivolous theories in an effort to defeat summary judgment motions, or to
create reasonable doubt."); Ronald L. Carlson, Getting a Grip on Experts, LrriG., Summer
1990, at 36 ("When an expert proposes to expound courtroom conclusions that rely
upon unadmitted background data, a trial judge must first look critically at those data. If
the foundation is shaky, this expert testimony should be refused, and not--as often hap-
pens today-be admitted 'for whatever it's worth.'" (emphasis added)); Michael H. Gra-
ham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of
Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45 ("Today practicing lawyers can locate quickly
and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly anything the lawyers desire."); Jack B.
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) ("An expert
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toxic tort cases. 2 Judges point to a variety of concerns with expert
testimony which include fears that experts will give opinions they
would be unwilling to submit for peer review,3 that juries will be
unable to determine the scientific issues without resorting to specu-
lation,4 and that juries will reach emotional decisions based on the
plight of the plaintiffs. 5
While commentators and courts agree on the need to gain
greater control over expert witnesses, they differ on the methods for
can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous,
thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid a summary judgment and force the matter to
trial.... Juries and judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the expert-for-hire.").
2 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (" 'Rigorous examination' is especially important in the mass toxic tort
context where presentation to the trier of theories of causation depends almost entirely
on expert testimony."), af'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988); see also Judges' Opinions, supra note 1, at 738-41 (a significantly greater
percentage of federal judges favor specific restrictions on expert testimony in complex
cases-including toxic torts-than favor restrictions on expert testimony in general).
3 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1234:
[M]any experts are members of the academic community who supple-
ment their teaching salaries with consulting work. We know from our
judicial experience that many such able persons present studies and ex-
press opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article sub-
mitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts
subject to peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with
many others, that ought to be considered in deciding whether to accept
expert testimony.
4 See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 309 (1989)
(footnote omitted):
Academic commentators have dubbed this case and others like it "mass
toxic torts." This represents a growing realization among academics,
lawyers, and judges that cases such as this present special problems and
challenges to traditional ideas regarding the role of the jury as a deci-
sionmaker....
... U]uries are asked to resolve these questions, upon which even
our brightest medical minds disagree, in order to resolve the case at hand
and decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery, and in so doing
must necessarily resort to speculation.
See also E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REv. 487, 492 n.22 (1989):
Our reliance on lay juries to assess the credibility of technical experts is
not a problem, of course, if one is willing to assume that something magi-
cal happens in the jury room so that ordinary people can suddenly un-
ravel complex technical and scientific issues that would baffle the rest
of us.
5 See, e.g., Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,
832 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989):
It would be foolhardy to expect members of the jury to be without com-
passion for the catastrophe that befell this family. That is a natural re-
sponse of the human spirit, and is without legal consequence so long as it
iq properly controlled. But in a case such as this it not only is appropriate
but indeed imperative that the court remain vigilant to ensure that
neither emotion nor confusion has supplanted reason.
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achieving that end.6 This Note objects to the means some courts
have chosen to achieve greater control over expert witnesses.
Those courts have unnecessarily and illegitimately broadened the
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, creating what amounts
to a "scientific consensus" standard for the proper reasoning and
methodology underlying scientific expert testimony.
Part I of this Note reviews two of the Federal Rules of Evidence
governing expert testimony: Rules 702 and 703. Part II discusses
the case law's expansion of Rule 703, in which courts have applied
the rule to the expert's methodology in addition to the "facts or
data' 7 upon which the expert relied. This broadened Rule 703 in
that neither the text of the rule nor the Advisory Committee's note
make mention of methodology or reasoning.8 After examining the
seminal case on this issue, a decision by Judge Weinstein in the liti-
gation over the defoliant "Agent Orange,".9 Part II discusses how
the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals further ex-
panded Rule 703's application in their treatments of expert testi-
mony in cases involving the pharmaceutical Bendectin.' 0 The
discussion then turns to the Third Circuit's refusal to apply the
"reasonable reliance" standard of Rule 703 to the expert's method-
ology in its Bendectin case, holding instead that the "helpfulness"
standard of Rule 702 more properly applied.1 1 Finally, Part II
briefly examines a recent Fifth Circuit decision 12 in which that court
took yet another route to examine the expert's methodology, resur-
recting the "general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States.13
Part III considers the problems raised by the federal courts' ex-
pansion of Rule 703. The failure of the courts to consistently apply
Rules 702 and 703 leads to confusion over the application of the
6 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1 (proposing that Rule 702 be modified to explicitly
incorporate Rule 403 balancing); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amend-
ment to Federal Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 102 (1987) (proposing a notice requirement be ap-
pended to Rule 702); Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability
Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1987) (proposing that Rule 702 be amended to explicitly re-
quire "reliable" evidence); James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revital-
ized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92 (1987) (proposing that
Rule 702 be amended to explicitly require the theory or technique underlying expert
testimony be "scientifically valid for the purposes for which it is tendered"); see also Bert
Black, A Unified Theoy of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595, 611 n.80 (1988)
(proposing a modification of Rule 702 that "essentially combines the proposals of
Professors Lederer, Berger and Starrs"). In setting out the need for reform, Black notes
that "there is no consensus on how to achieve these objectives." Id at 598.
7 FED. R. EvID. 703.
8 See infra text accompanying note 27 (quoting text of FED. R. EvID. 703).
9 See infra part II.A.
10 See infra part II.B.I.-3.
I I See infra part II.B.4.
12 See infra part II.C.
13 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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rules by courts and commentators. This leads to unpredictable evi-
dentiary rulings and obfuscated discussion of attempts to reform
these rules.
After establishing the need for courts to differentiate between
Rules 702 and 703, this Note proposes that the approach taken by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals 14 and by at least five of the judges of the Fifth Circuit
in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. 15 represents a consistent and
practical application of Rules 702 and 703 to expert testimony in
civil cases.16 Adoption of the DeLuca approach by other circuits
would alleviate much of the existing confusion surrounding the
proper application of the Federal Rules of Evidence to the bases of
expert testimony.
I
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE GOVERNING EXPERT
TESTIMONY
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 liberal-
ized the admissibility of expert testimony. 17 Of the rules governing
expert testimony, Rules 702 and 703 are the most important.' 8
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of testimony by experts, while
Rule 703 regulates the facts or data on which those experts may rely
in formulating their opinions. It is the latter rule that most sharply
changed expert witness practice.19
A. Rule 702
Although Rule 702 did not significantly depart from the com-
mon law, when combined with the other rules governing expert tes-
timony, particularly Rule 703, "the door to expert testimony [was]
14 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
15 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
16 This Note only addresses expert testimony in civil cases. As noted by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, permissible bases for expert testimony may require
different treatment in criminal cases. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 957 n.20 (citing United States
v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 & n.22 (3d Cir. 1985)).
17 See Graham, supra note 1, at 43; see also Faust F. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the
Expert Witness, LITIG., Fall 1985, at 18 ("The welcome mat was rolled out in 1975, when
Congress enacted Federal Evidence Rules 702 through 705. These four provisions,
comprising only six sentences, confirmed the judicial trend toward expanded admissibil-
ity of expert testimony.").
18 "Rules 702 and 703 are not only the first article VII provisions dealing with ex-
pert testimony; they are also the two most important parts of the statutory scheme for
regulating the admissibility of expert testimony." Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases"of
Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988).
19 SeeJames W. McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MER-
CER L. REV. 463,480 (1977) ("Perhaps the most striking change anywhere in the Federal
Rules is contained in Rule 703.").
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opened far wider than before." 20 The rule consists of a single
sentence:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.2'
Perhaps the only liberalizing aspect of Rule 702 itself is its elimina-
tion of the requirement that the subject of expert testimony lie
outside common knowledge. 22 As long as the witness qualifies as an
expert, the testimony need only be "helpful" to the trier of fact in
order to be admissible. 23 The test under Rule 702 is two-fold: does
the witness qualify as an expert, and, if so, will the proffered testi-
mony assist the trier of fact?24
B. Rule 703
Rule 703 dramatically expanded the permissible bases for ex-
pert testimony. 25 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, an
expert witness could only rely on facts or data that had been person-
ally observed or had been made known to the witness at or before
trial. 26 An expert may still rely on either of those bases to form an
opinion under the Federal Rules. However, Rule 703, which gov-
erns permissible bases for expert testimony, provides an additional
third basis on which an expert may rely:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field informing opinions or inferences upon
the subject. the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.27
In this second sentence "Rule 703 makes its major contribution," 28
aiming to bring expert witness practice in the courtroom in line with
20 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 380, at
633 (1979).
21 FED. R. EVID. 702.
22 LOUiSELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 380, at 633.
23 Id.
24 Graham, supra note 1, at 47-48.
25 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
26 Id.; 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
703[01], at 703-5 to -6 (1990).
27 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
28 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 387, at 652; see also McElhaney, supra note
19, at 481 ("[I]t is the second sentence which makes a radical departure from the com-
mon law .... ).
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that of experts in their respective professions. 29 Rule 703 allows an
expert to rely on any basis, otherwise admissible into evidence or
not, as long as other experts in the field would "reasonably" rely
upon that basis.30
The second sentence of Rule 703 revolutionized expert witness
practice in the federal courts3 l as well as in most state courts.3 2
Needless to say, courts were left with some freedom in determining
how to apply the new rule since all of the nuances of such a change
could not be addressed by that single sentence.33 Courts and com-
mentators continue to debate the trial court's role in determining
whether the expert's reliance on the basis in question is reason-
able,3 4 and whether courts should allow into evidence the otherwise
29 The third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of
data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception.
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opin-
ions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
30 In addition to meeting the tests of Rules 702 and 703, expert testimony must
also pass the test of Rule 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 limits the admissibility of
all evidence, including expert testimony: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. So while
proffered testimony may pass both Rules 702 and 703, if it fails to pass Rule 403, it
should not be admitted into evidence.
Some courts have used Rule 403 to exclude scientific expert testimony of low pro-
bative value, which would otherwise satisfy Rules 702 and 703, on the grounds that it
might mislead the jury. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[a] false aura of scientific infallibility, coupled with low
probative value, increases resistance to admitting evidence since it multiplies the
hazards of misleading a jury"), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); see also Graham, supra note 1, at 63. But cf. DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3rd Cir. 1990) (arguing that if expert
testimony meets the requirements of Rules 702 and 703, it is unlikely that it will fail to
meet Rule 403).
31 Graham, supra note 1, at 43; see also McElhaney, supra note 19, at 480.
32 Many state evidence codes are modeled on the Federal Rules. Thirty-three
states have adopted the substance, if not the precise language, of Rule 703. New Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 703 follows the language of the Federal Rule verbatim and has
been adopted by 26 of the 33 states mentioned. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 26,
703[05].
33 See generally SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 204-15 (1983) [hereinafter EMERG-
ING PROBLEMS].
34 This question involves whether the trial court can impose an independent rea-
sonableness standard on the expert's reliance, or whether it is enough that experts in
the field customarily rely on the type of data upon which the expert intends to rely. In In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rez'd on other
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986),
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that it was obliged to determine the
reasonableness of the expert's reliance. The court noted that "[tihe proper inquiry is
356 [Vol. 77:350
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inadmissible basis on which the expert has relied in reaching his
conclusionAs 5
Recently, another question has arisen. Perhaps in response to
the perceived need to gain greater control over expert testimony3 6
or to the increased use of statistical evidence to prove causation,3 7
courts have begun to use Rule 703 to exclude expert testimony, par-
ticularly scientific testimony, on the grounds that the expert has in-
sufficient basis for the proffered opinion. Under the traditional
approach, a court might exclude expert testimony for lack of a suffi-
cient basis for the opinion when the expert reached a conclusion
without having any facts, in or out of the record, on which an expert
in the field would rely to support that conclusion. 38
In determining if an expert lacks a sufficient basis for a prof-
fered opinion, courts have traditionally focused on what constitutes
an adequate basis. However, in several of .the cases examined be-
low, the courts have begun to look beyond whether the expert has
an adequate basis for an opinion to whether most experts would,
not what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem it to
be." Id. at 276.
Judge Weinstein noted an alternative, more restrictive approach in In re Agent Or-
ange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244: "The more restrictive view requires the trial court to deter-
mine not only whether the data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field, but also whether the underlying data are untrustworthy for hearsay or other
reasons."
35 Rule 703 can be, and frequently is, used to circumvent various exclusionary rules
of evidence, such as the hearsay rules. For example, an attorney can admit a piece of
otherwise inadmissible evidence by simply finding an expert witness who will attest to
reliance on the fact or datum in question. The attorney then seeks to admit into evi-
dence the otherwise inadmissible evidence as the basis of the expert's opinion. Critics of
this use of the rule refer to it as a "back door" exception to the hearsay rules. EMERGING
PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 204; Rossi, supra note 17, at 23. Commentators differ on the
wisdom of allowing the rule to operate in this manner. Compare LoUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 20, § 389, at 663 and Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modem Expert
Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986) with MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 703. 1, at 629 (2d ed. 1986) and Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for
Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987); see
also ABA Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence, Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299, 369-70 (pro-
posing a change in Rule 703 to deal with the problem). See generally PeterJ. Rescori,
Comment, Fed. R. Evid 703: A Back Door Entrance for Hearsay and Other Inadmissible Evi-
dence: A Time for Change?, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 543 (1990).
36 See supra note 1 (listing courts and commentators asserting the need for greater
control over expert witnesses).
37 See, e.g.,Judges' Opinions, supra note 1, at 738-41 (illustrating that a significantly
greater percentage of federal judges favor specific restrictions on statistical evidence in
complex cases-including toxic torts-than favor restrictions on expert testimony in
general).
38 For example, in In re Agent Orange the court excluded the health problem check-
lists filled out by plaintiffs as the primary medical records on which an expert relied in
determining whether an herbicide had caused those ailments. In re Agent Orange, 611 F.
Supp. at 1245-47. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
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looking at the same facts, draw the same conclusion as the expert. This
constitutes an expanded application of Rule 703 that can have dras-
tic effects if applied too broadly. Rule 703 is applied too broadly
when a court excludes the testimony of an expert who relies on the
same facts as the opposing party's expert, but simply draws a differ-
ent conclusion from those facts.
When a court applies Rule 703 in this fashion to exclude expert
testimony in toxic tort cases, its evidentiary ruling can be dispositive
of the case 39 because the crucial issue of causation in toxic tort cases
often hinges on expert testimony.40 When a court uses Rule 703 to
exclude an expert on causation, a grant of summary judgment fre-
quently follows. 4 1 Similarly, when a court does not apply Rule 703
until trial or post-trial, grants of judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict are not uncommon. 42
II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADER EXCLUSION UNDER
RULE 703
A. The "Agent Orange" Litigation
The litigation surrounding the use of the defoliant "Agent
Orange" in Vietnam was astounding in both scope and complex-
ity.43 More than 15,000 individuals filed in excess of 600 separate
39 [Tihe courts' ability to handle controversies about scientific and technical
facts does have a major effect on verdicts and settlements in areas such as
toxic torts, products liability, and medical malpractice. Practical results
in these fields are more likely to be influenced by the evidentiary rulings
on innovative theories of fact than by substantive law.
Elliott, supra note 4, at 488.
40 Judge Weinstein noted that fact as the basis for a slightly different conclusion in
In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244: "[I]n the mass toxic tort context. . . presenta-
tion to the trier of theories of causation depends almost entirely on expert testimony."
Commentators agree that "[i]n a typical, modem toxic torts case, expert testimony con-
necting the substance in question to the injury allegedly suffered is the very heart of the
plaintiff's case." Paul F. Rothstein & Michael Crew, When Should the Judge Keep Expert
Testimony From the Jury?, INSIDE LITIG., Apr. 1987, at 19.
41 See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 131 F.R.D. 71 (D.N.J.), rerVd,
911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), aft'd, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1990); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 646 F. Supp.
856 (D. Mass. 1986), aflt'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (Ist Cir. 1987); In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp.
1223.
42 See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989);
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1988 WL 64933 (D.D.C. filed June 13,
1988), rev'd, 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aft'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882
(1989).
43 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORAXNGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISAS.:T Rs IN THE
COURTS 4 (1986).
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actions44 that Chief Judge Jack Weinstein of the j astern District of
New York eventually consolidated into a single class action. The
court defined the plaintiff class to include "those persons who were
in the United States, New Zealand or Australian Armed Forces at
any time from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or near Viet-
nam by exposure .to Agent Orange" and any immediate family mem-
bers of veterans injured by the exposure.45 The plaintiffs sought
relief on "theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty,
intentional tort, and nuisance" 46 against the defendant chemical
companies. After almost six years of litigation, the parties settled in
May 1984, creating a fund of $180 million.47
Though the case involved many decisions,48 perhaps the most
"far-reaching" 49 was Judge Weinstein's decision not to allow the
cases of the almost 300 individuals who had opted out of the class
settlement to survive summary judgment.5 0 That decision hinged
on his finding that the plaintiffs' expert testimony was inadmissible
under both Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 403.51
Judge Weinstein first considered the admissibility of the plain-
tiffs' experts' testimony under the liberal standards of Rule 702,
looking both to the experts' qualifications and the "helpfulness" of
their testimony.5 2 He found that both witnesses, Drs. Singer and
Epstein, were qualified as experts by their education and experi-
ence. Judge Weinstein also found that the experts' testimony would
be helpful to the trier of fact because the testimony dealt with causa-
tion, an issue central to the case. 55 Judge Weinstein's analysis did
not end there, however, he proceeded to examine the bases of the
experts' testimony under both Rules 703 and 403.5 4
44 Id
45 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988). Of the over 2.6 million veterans who served in Vietnam during that period, it is
estimated that 600,000 were exposed to Agent Orange. Id at 1229-30.
46 lId at 1229.
47 SCHUCK, supra note 43, at 5. Judge Weinstein, who had pursued settlement from
the time he took on the case, id. at 143, approved of the settlement in In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
48 See SCHUCK, supra note 43, at 124-42.
49 hd at 234.
50 In reAgent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1230.
51 Id. at 1256. See supra note 30 (discussing the application of Rule 403 to expert
testimony).
52 See supra text accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing the application of Rule 702).
53 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
54 See supra note 30 (discussing the relationship between Rules 403, 702, and 703).
Judge Weinstein found the testimony in question implicated several Rule 403 considera-
tions: "There is a strong probability that the doctors' testimony would mislead and
confuse at least some members of the jury. Establishing the low probative value of the
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Before analyzing the experts' testimony under Rules 703 and
403, Judge Weinstein determined that the testimony deserved par-
ticularly close scrutiny for several reasons. He noted that "[w]hen
either the expert's qualifications or his testimony lie at the periphery
of what the scientific community considers acceptable, special care
should be exercised in evaluating the reliability and probative worth
of the proffered testimony under rules 703 and 403."55 He further
suggested that "[c]ourts are particularly wary of unfounded expert
opinion when causation is the issue," 56 and concluded that
"'[r]igorous examination' is especially important in the mass toxic
tort context where presentation to the trier of theories of causation
depends almost entirely on expert testimony." 57 Having deter-
mined the necessity of so-called "strict scrutiny"'58 or "active re-
view" 59 of the expert testimony, Judge Weinstein examined the
bases of the expert testimony under Rule 703.60
affidavits would entail an unwarranted expenditure of time and effort. The introduction
of plaintiffs' evidence would protract this prolonged litigation." In re Agent Orange, 611
F. Supp. at 1256.
55 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242. These factors appear more relevant to
an analysis under Rule 702 than to Rules 703 and 403. See supra text accompanying
notes 20-24 (discussing Rule 702's "helpfulness" standard). The court may have meant
to say that when testimony barely satisfies the liberal admissibility standard of Rule 702,
it deserves closer scrutiny under Rules 703 and 403. Toxic torts, the court later states,
almost presumptively fall into this category of testimony: "The uncertainty of the evi-
dence in [toxic tort] cases, dependent as it is upon speculative scientific hypotheses and
epidemiological studies, creates a special need for robust screening of experts and
gatekeeping under rules 403 and 703 by the court." In reAgent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at
1260. Even if one grants the premise that such evidence is often speculative, it may be
more consistent with the text of the rules to exclude the testimony under Rule 702. See
infra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of excluding testimony
under Rule 702 rather than Rule 703).
56 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1249.
57 Id at 1244.
58 D.C. Circuit Panel Takes Demanding Look At Expert Testimony, INSiDE LrriG., Nov.
1988, at 1; Rothstein & Crew, supra note 40, at 26; Vicki Christian, Comment, Admissibil-
ity of Scientific Expert Testimony: Is Bad Science Making Law?, 18 N. Ky. L. REv. 21,40 (1990).
59 Black, supra note 6, at 674; L.L. Plotkin, Recent Development, Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What is the Court's Role in Evaluating Expert Testimony?, 64 Tu-
LANE L. REv. 1263 (1990).
60 Judge Weinstein interpreted Rule 703 as requiring an independent finding by
the trial court of the reasonableness of the expert's reliance. In re Agent Orange, 611 F.
Supp. at 1245 ("the court may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if
the bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility").
Although this need for an independent finding may have led to the rigorous examina-
tion the court gave the testimony, the testimony appears to be excludable under the less
restrictive standard of Rule 703 adopted by other circuits. Even if a court used the more
liberal standard of In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d Cir.
1983), which requires the court to determine whether experts in the field customarily
rely upon the data in question, rather than Judge Weinstein's more restrictive standard,
which requires the court to independently determine whether reliance is reasonable, the
court would likely exclude the questionnaires as a basis for expert testimony. The same
is not true, however, of the In re Agent Orange court's treatment of the basis of the plain-
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1. Admissibility of the Medical Symptom Questionnaires
The plaintiffs' experts in In re Agent Orange based their finding
that Agent Orange had caused the plaintiffs' illnesses largely on
checklists of medical symptoms filled out by the plaintiffs in prepara-
tion for the litigation.6 1 Judge Weinstein found that other doctors
in this field would not normally rely on such checklists in diagnosing
the health problems allegedly caused by exposure to Agent
Orange.62 The court went so far as to take "judicial notice-based
on hundreds of trials-that no reputable physician relies on hearsay
checklists by litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the cause
of their afflictions."63 The court further described the records con-
stituting the inadmissible basesas "self-serving laypersons' general
affidavits and checklists prepared in gross for a complex litiga-
tion."64 The court found that these records met neither the stan-
dard of reasonable reliance expressed in Rule 703 nor the
underlying purpose of trustworthiness, 65 because "the usual induce-
ment to candor with a physician-the hope of successful treatment
or diagnosis-was totally lacking. ' ' 66 The court further stated that
the "plaintiffs had every incentive to be overinclusive in describing
their symptoms." 67
This Note asserts that the In re Agent Orange court's use of Rule
703 to exclude the medical symptom questionnaires is perfectly ac-
ceptable. The In re Agent Orange court's application of Rule 703 to
the questionnaires is representative of how courts regularly use the
rule to exclude a basis of expert testimony. That doctors would not
tiffs' experts' testimony linking Agent Orange to the plaintiffs' ailments. See infra text
accompanying notes 70-96.
61 Dr. Singer relied exclusively on these checklists, while Dr. Epstein claimed to
have relied "at least in part on medical and military records to corroborate the extent of
plaintiffs' exposure and the nature of their illnesses." In reAgent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at
1247.
62 Id. at 1246.
63 Id
64 Id. at 1247.
65 Judge Weinstein noted that
Rule 703 permits experts to rely upon hearsay. The guarantee of trust-
worthiness is that it be of the kind normally employed by experts in the
field. The expert is assumed, if he meets the test of Rule 702, to have the
skill to properly evaluate the hearsay, giving it probative force appropri-
ate to the circumstances.
Id at 1245.
66 Id at 1247.
67 Id.
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rely, reasonably or even customarily, 68 on such materials in making
diagnoses is so apparent that the court took judicial notice of it.69
2. Admissibility of the Causation Testimony
While the court's use of Rule 703 to exclude the medical
symptom questionnaires is acceptable, the court's "rigorous exami-
nation" 70 or "strict scrutiny" 71 of the expert testimony, resulting in
a finding that the plaintiffs' experts failed to have a reasonable basis
for their testimony on causation, is more problematic. Based on
that finding, the court excluded the experts' testimony and granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 72
Toxic tort cases generally present two questions of causation. 73
The plaintiff must first establish "that the chemical involved is capa-
ble of causing the type of harm from which the plaintiff suffers."'74
Animal studies and epidemiological studies are often useful in an-
swering this question. 75 Once this threshold question is answered,
68 The distinction between reasonable and customary reliance refers to whether a
court simply determines if experts in the field consider reliance reasonable or whether
the court must independently determine the reasonableness of the reliance. See supra
note 34 (discussing the two approaches). One commentator suggests that if deference
was intended, "customarily" could have been used instead of "reasonably" in Rule 703.
GRAHAM, supra note 35, § 703.1, at 626 n.12.
69 Judge Weinstein noted that not even the experts themselves claimed that their
reliance was routine: "none of plaintiffs' experts assert that they normally rely on hear-
say checklists... in reaching conclusions as to the causes of their patients' illnesses." In
re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1246. A commentator agrees:
The physician had examined simple questionnaires filled out by plaintiffs,
and then concluded their problems were related to Agent Orange. After
all the expert testimony in depositions during the litigation, it would be
difficult to imagine a more bizarre evidentiary basis for deciding the cau-
sation issue in the Agent Orange litigation.
Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative
Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1, 54 (1989) (footnote omitted).
70 See supra text accompanying note 57.
71 See supra text accompanying note 58.
72 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1256, 1260.
73 Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227 (1987).
74 Id This question is difficult when dealing with injuries such as cancer, the causa-
tion of which is not clearly understood. Id. Birth defects also fall into this category. See
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir. 1990).
75 Farber, supra note 73, at 1228. "Epidemiology, a branch of science and
medicine, uses studies to 'observe the effect of exposure to a single factor upon the
incidence of disease in two otherwise identical populations.' " DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 945
(quoting Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FOUDHAM L. REv. 732, 755 (1984)). "For illnesses whose cause is incompletely under-
stood, the most important generalized evidence of causation is epidemiology." Michael
Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7
HARV. ENvrLt. L. REv. 429, 430-31 (1983) (footnote omitted).
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there remains the question of specific causation. 76 The plaintiff
must establish that "given that the toxic substance in question can
cause harm of the type suffered by the plaintiff, . . .the plaintiff's
harm did in fact result from such exposure." 7 7 Here, animal and
epidemiological studies only provide indirect support, often supply-
ing the basis from which to infer an affirmative answer to this
question. 78
The questionnaires relied on by the medical experts in In re
Agent Orange addressed the second question, to the degree they ad-
dressed either. The questionnaires were designed to establish the
medical problems the plaintiffs had suffered. They did not, how-
ever, establish the link between Agent Orange and those ailments
generally. The plaintiffs relied on their medical experts to establish
that link.
Although courts historically have shown great deference to
medical experts, 79 Judge Weinstein accorded the experts in Agent
Orange no such deference.80 He found their testimony inadequate
76 Various labels are used to distinguish the two questions. A practitioners' hand-
book uses "threshold" and "specific." Larry D. Espel & G. Marc Whitehead, Scientific
Experts in Toxic Tort or Drug Cases, in EXPERT WrTNESSEs 453, 456 (Faust F. Rossi ed.,
1991). Courts sometimes use "general" or "generic" and "individual." See, e.g.,
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). Another commentator labels the questions "risk"
and "occurrence." Dore, supra note 75, at 435.
Judge Weinstein noted the distinction clearly in an earlier opinion in this litigation
in which he indicated "[iut is important in considering the facts to keep clearly in mind
... the different problems of proof posed in determining if dioxin [a chemical in Agent
Orange] can cause certain diseases and whether it did cause a particular disease or defect in
a particular person." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 780
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). In that opinion, Judge Weinstein
referred to the specific causation question as the "indeterminate plaintiff problem." Id.
at 842. One commentator asserts that that opinion "has provided the most extensive
judicial discussion of toxic causation." Farber, supra note 73, at 1234.
77 Farber, supra note 73, at 1228.
78 A commentator describes the role of epidemiology as follows:
Epidemiological studies address questions such as "Does exposure to this
chemical increase the incidence of cancer in a population?" but not "Did
exposure to this chemical cause a particular person's cancer?" Such gen-
eralized evidence may help demonstrate that a particular event occurred,
but only when accompanied by more specific evidence.
Dore, supra note 75, at 431 (footnotes omitted); see also Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K.
Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 441,
445 (1983) (footnote omitted):
[Ain epidemiological study does establish a relationship between a chem-
ical and disease. Although the epidemiological study by itself does not
conclusively show that an individual plaintiff's injury was caused by expo-
sure to a particular chemical, it is at least relevant circumstantial evi-
dence, showing the probability of a relationship between the chemical in
question and the injury.
79 See Black, supra note 6, at 662 (attributing "[t]he deference accorded physicians
by courts and lawyers [to] the rigorous education and licensing of medical doctors").
80 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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on both causation questions.8 1 On the general causation question,
Judge Weinstein faulted the experts' reliance on animal studies
8 2
and their failure to consider the existing epidemiological data.8 3 On
the specific causation question, Judge Weinstein criticized the ex-
perts' reliance on hearsay checklists as evidence of injury,8 4 the ex-
perts' similar lack of evidence on exposure,85 and the experts'
"inability to exclude other possible causes of plaintiffs' illnesses-
those arising out of their service in Vietnam as well as those that all
of us face in military and civilian life."' 86 He considered it a "fatal
flaw.., that no account is taken of the relative degree of specific
health problems of those exposed to Agent Orange as compared
with those not exposed," noting that "[a]ll the studies to date indi-
cate no significant differences."87
This Note finds the court's approach in In re Agent Orange prob-
lematic because Judge Weinstein essentially required the plaintiffs
to provide an epidemiological study to support the expert opinions
on causation.88 He did not deny that Agent Orange has caused
some diseases;8 9 he simply wanted studies to substantiate the ex-
perts' opinions that Agent Orange had caused the plaintiffs' dis-
eases. Because "[n]o acceptable study to date of Vietnam veterans
and their families concludes that there is a causal connection be-
tween exposure to Agent Orange and the serious adverse health ef-
fects claimed by plaintiffs," 9 Judge Weinstein concluded that the
experts had no reasonable basis, as required by Rule 703, for their
opinions:
81 Judge Weinstein described one of the experts' reasoning as follows: "[Tihe affi-
ants complain of various medical problems; animals and workers exposed to extensive
dosages of [the chemical] have suffered from related difficulties; therefore, assuming
nothing else caused the affiants' afflictions, Agent Orange caused them." In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). Judge Weinstein
found this "analysis, in addition to being speculative .... so guarded as to be worthless."
Id. at 1238.
82 Id at 1241.
83 Id at 1250. Judge Weinstein had takenjudicial notice of several epidemiological
studies. Id at 1240.
84 Id. at 1246-47.
85 Id. at 1247-48.
86 Id. at 1250. See Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 270 n.6 (3d Cir.
1991) ("The terms 'differential diagnosis' are used to describe a process whereby medi-
cal doctors experienced in diagnostic techniques provide testimony countering other
possible causes . . .of the injuries at issue."); Elliott, supra note 4, at 497 (footnote
omitted) ("Judge Weinstein ... emphasized that the plaintiffs' experts failed to consider
and exclude other known causes for the health problems they attributed to Agent Or-
ange (a process which doctors call 'differential diagnosis').").
87 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1248.
88 See Brennan, supra note 69, at 53.
89 In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1231.
90 Id.
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Rio the extent that these experts rely on available epidemiologi-
cal studies, the studies supply no basis for an inference of causa-
tion. There is simply no other reliable data on which an expert
can furnish reliable testimony. Thus, no expert tendered by
plaintiffs would be permitted to testify under Rules 702 and 703
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 1
Although Judge Weinstein's decision was a district court opin-
ion, affirmed on an unrelated ground,92 it has received widespread
notice. 93 Commentators have criticized the decision, 94 and courts
91 ML at 1234. The reference to Rule 702 is somewhat mysteribus in light ofJudge
Weinstein's finding that the proffered experts satisfy the qualifications and helpfulness
requirements of Rule 702. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
92 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the
defendant was a government contractor. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
93 Courts and commentators may have paid particularly dose attention to the opin-
ion because Judge Weinstein, as author of the treatise that bears his name, is one of the
most notable commentators on evidence.
94 The decision has been criticized on a variety of grounds. One commentator criti-
cized Judge Weinstein's decision from a medical standpoint:
Judge Weinstein was wrong to ignore animal data and other toxicological
studies simply because there were negative epidemiological studies in ev-
idence. Negative epidemiological studies carry little-weight because they
are often not sufficiently powerful to uncover an association. Moreover,
the judge paid insufficient attention to positive epidemiological studies;
he dismissed them because they were not specific studies of Agent Or-
ange and veterans. Certainly the judge and his clerks read a lot of studies
and reached some conclusions, and for this they are to be credited. The
judge's decision is, however, wrong from a toxicological point of view.
Brennan, supra note 69, at 56 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Schuck's criticism is milder, but more thorough. On the scientific ques-
tions, he claimsJudge Weinstein was "self-taught and incompletely informed, lacking in
the intuition and finely honed technical judgment of the experienced scientist."
SCHUCK, supra note 43, at 239. According to Schuck, this "tempted [the judge] to jump
in boldly where even specialists feared to tread." IL Further, Schuck criticizes Judge
Weinstein's use of precedent: "none of the cases Weinstein cited to support his eviden-
tiary ruling clearly compelled exclusion, much less summary judgment." Id Schuck
also argues that "Weinstein's 'rigorous examination' manifested a certain niggardliness
in summing up the veterans' evidence." IdL at 240. Schuck concludes that "the propri-
ety of Weinstein's grant of summary judgment remains a close question-probably
wrong, but not clearly so." Id at 241. Schuck notes that "even the chemical companies
had assumed prior to the settlement that a summary judgment motion would be fu-
tile." Id
Other commentators have been pleased with the end result of the litigation, if not
the means. For example, Professor Nesson was impressed with the handling of the case:
"Judge Weinstein achieved a remarkable outcome, truly a tremendous accomplish-
ment." Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowl-
edge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 525 (1986). But Nesson disagreed with the conclusive effect
the court gave statistical proof:
Judge Weinstein built his resolution of the controversy on a conception
of proof that seems wrong to me. His view reflects an erroneous and
hard-edged statistical concept of probability, which obscures the differ-
ence between law and science. Although he has settled the Agent Orange
cases, his approach, if it becomes dogma, will gravely incapacitate the
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have cited it as authority for requiring epidemiological studies in
other cases, 95 In short, In re Agent Orange is considered the trend-
setting precedent for applying strict scrutiny to scientific expert
testimony.9 6
B. The Bendectin Cases
The litigation concerning the pharmaceutical Bendectin was al-
most as extensive as the Agent Orange litigation.97 Bendectin was
an antinausea pregnancy drug produced by Merrell-Dow from 1957
to 1983.98 Although most experts, including the Food and Drug
Administration, 99 concluded that Bendectin does not cause birth de-
fects, vast numbers of plaintiffs sued Merrell-Dow alleging that
Benedictin had caused their--or their children's-birth defects. t0 0
dispute-resolving powers of courts in toxic tort cases. It leaves entirely to
defendants the range between what jurors and members of the public can
rationally believe, and what statisticians can prove.
Id at 526; see also Farber, supra note 73, at 1236 n.76:
Judge Weinstein's opinion is highly persuasive as a judgment on the mer-
its. Indeed, it reads very much like the opinion a judge would write after
a bench trial. It is not clear, however, whether [the flaws in the plaintiffs'
evidence], which mostly go to the weight of the evidence, should have led
to a finding of inadmissibility followed by summary judgment rather than
letting the cases go to the jury.
95 See, e.g., Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,
831 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-National
Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987); Weldon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 408
(N.D.N.Y. 1990); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-73
(S.D. Cal. 1989). But see Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 898-901 (D. Minn.
1990) (declining to require epidemiological proof of plaintiff's harm).
96 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 69, at 9 n.40 (citations omitted):
A disturbing trend is developing in the federal courts, likely arising out of
Judge Weinstein's opinion in the [In re Agent Orange] decision. The fed-
eral judiciary has begun to countenance more judicial activism regarding
expert testimony. Thus, judges are now scrutinizing experts' qualifica-
tions and deposition testimony quite closely.
When the court is unconvinced, it grants defendants' motions for
summary judgment. Rather rare before Weinstein's [In re Agent Orange]
decision, this movement is gathering momentum.
See also Elliott, supra note 4, at 494 ("One new variant of the judicial exclusion strategy
was pioneered by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation. This approach uses
summary judgment to exclude expert testimony that fails to meet minimal standards of
trustworthiness and credibility." (footnote omitted)); Rothstein & Crew, supra note 40,
at 21-22 ("The camp of strict screening of expert testimony is epitomized by one of the
decisions in the multifaceted Agent Orange litigation.....").
97 See Black, supra note 6, at 679-80 ("[c]ourts in 49 states and the District of Co-
lumbia have had to deal with Bendectin cases").
98 Id at 679.
99 Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 802-03 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
100 "The drug was prescribed routinely from 1957 until 1983 .... Because it was so
widely used and because about two to five percent of all children are born with defects,
whether or not their mother used Bendectin during pregnancy, the pool of potential
plaintiffs is large and ubiquitous." Black, supra note 6. at 679 (footnotes omitted).
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The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated over
1000 cases for pretrial purposes before Judge Carl Rubin in the
Southern District of Ohio.101 At the close of the pretrial proceed-
ings, plaintiffs were given the choice of proceeding in a consolidated
action for trial or having their cases remanded to the court in which
their actions had been brought.10 2 The consolidated trial resulted
in a jury verdict for the defendant. 03 The cases discussed below
involve plaintiffs who either chose to have their proceedings re-
manded following pretrial discovery' 04 or who brought their cases
after the date of the consolidated action.105
1. Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories (The First Circuit)
In Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories,'0 6 the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit faced the evidentiary questions presented by ex-
pert causation testimony relating to Bendectin. As in each of the
cases that follow, a pregnant woman had taken Bendectin, a pre-
scription antinausea drug, as a remedy for morning sickness, 10 7 and
had later given birth to a child who had a limb-reduction birth
defect.'08 The plaintiffs in Lynch sued the manufacturer of Bendec-
tin alleging negligence, failure to warn, false advertising, breach of
warranty, and defective design.10 9 The trial court granted the de-
fendant summary judgment, finding, for the purposes of this
101 In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1216 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). TheJudicial Panel derives its authority from 28
U.S.C. § 1407, which provides that "civil actions involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact ... pending in different districts" may be consolidated upon a "determina-
tion that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) (1988). See generally 15 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 3861-3868 (2d ed. 1986) (detailing procedures for complex multi-district
litigation).
102 In re Richardson-Merrell, 624 F. Supp. at 1216. Just as the consolidated trial be-
gan, Judge Rubin attempted to certify a class for settlement, but the court of appeals
found such a certification beyond the judge's authority. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
103 In re Richardson-Merrell, 624 F. Supp. 1212.
104 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 824-25; Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190,
1191 (Ist Cir. 1987).
105 Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
131 F.R.D. 71 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., No. 83-3504, 1988 WL 64933 (D.D.C. filed June 13, 1988), rev'd, 897 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
106 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
107 Id. at 1191.
108 Margo Lynch "was born without a right hand and without the lower portion of
her right forearm." kLd
109 Id.
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Note, ° that because the plaintiffs' experts' testimony was inadmis-
sible, there was insufficient proof of causation."' The appellate
court affirmed the exclusion of plaintiffs' expert testimony under
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 703, and consequently affirmed
the grant of summary judgment.1 12
Before examining the testimony offered by each of the plain-
tiffs' experts, the Lynch court established the standard that the testi-
mony would have to meet. In light of the defendants'
overwhelming" 3 epidemiological data, the Lynch court, similar to
the In reAgent Orange court,' 1 4 found that "[a] new study coming to a
different conclusion and challenging the consensus would be admis-
sible evidence." 15 But "[w]ithout such a study there is nothing on which
expert opinion on Bendectin as a cause may be based." " 6
After establishing the burden it required the plaintiffs' experts
to meet, the court described the experts' qualifications" 17 and pro-
ceeded to examine their testimony. The plaintiffs' first expert, Dr.
110 The trial court also held that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped by the judg-
ment in the consolidated proceeding in Ohio. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying
text. The court of appeals reversed that ruling, noting that "[i]f they were now bound,
the multi-district litigation would in effect have been a class action leaving the Lynches
no true option." Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1193.
I1I lId
112 Id at 1196-97.
113 Id. at 1194.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
115 Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 The court described the experts' qualifications in detail:
Dr. Done [is] a 1952 graduate of the medical school of the University of
Utah. Done was an assistant professor of pediatrics at Stanford from
1958 to 1960; a professor of pediatrics at Utah from 1960 to 1971; a
special assistant to the director of the Bureau of Drugs in the Food and
Drug Administration, 1971-1974; and a professor of pediatrics and phar-
mnacology at the College of Medicine, Wayne State University, 1975 to
date ....
... Shanna Helen Swan [holds] a 1963 doctorate in statistics from
the University of California at Berkeley. Swan had served from 1969 to
1975 as senior biostatistician in a Kaiser Health contraceptive drug study;
been associate professor of mathematics at California State University,
Sonoma, from 1974 to 1979; directed between 1979 and 1981 the train-
ing program in biostatistics and epidemiology at the School of Public
Health of the University of California, Berkeley; and, while remaining in
this school, has been since 1981 the chief of the Methodology and Analy-
sis Unit, Epidemiology and Statistics, Department of Health Services of
the State of California.
Id at 1194-95.
The court of appeals did not mention any objection to the experts' qualifications,
and, given the liberal standard of Rule 702, see supra text accompanying notes 20-24
(discussing the application of Rule 702), it is difficult to imagine a court that would
refuse to qualify the plaintiffs' two witnesses as experts. But see infra note 162 (sug-
gesting that experts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder do not meet the
standards of Rule 702).
T~- --
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Alan Done, had based his opinion that Bendectin could cause limb
reduction on "in vivo animal studies, in vitro animal studies, and the
study of 'analogous' chemicals."" 8 Citing In re Agent Orange, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Dr. Done's
studies could not prove "causation in human beings in the absence
of any confirmatory epidemiological data." 119
The court of appeals took a slightly different approach to the
proffered testimony of the plaintiffs' second expert, Dr. Shanna
Swan. Dr. Swan based her opinion that Bendectin causes limb-
reduction birth defects on her reanalysis of data that had been previ-
ously analyzed by the Center for Disease Control.' 20 The court ex-
amined her findings closely, seemingly second-guessing the choices
she had made in reanalyzing the data. 12 1 After noting that her study
and conclusions had never been published in a scientific journal, the
court found that her study "could not form the foundation for an
expert opinion challenging the scientific consensus."' 122
The court of appeals only attempted to explain under which
rules it had found the testimony inadmissible in the concluding sec-
tion of its opinion. In that section, the court, after expressing a fear
ofjury lawlessness, praised the district court's rejection of the testi-
mony under Rules 403 and 703:
The sight of a helpless mutilated youngster may evoke emotion
along with the corresponding wish to make somebody pay for his
or her plight.... With this very real possibility of runaway emo-
tion overcoming judgment, the district court's firm rejection here
of foundationless expert testimony was necessary, admirable, and
entirely within the discretion of the court under Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 703.123
The fear of jury lawlessness provides a clear ground for exclusion
under Rule 403 when a court determines that the prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value. 124 Such a fear, however, does not
seem relevant to the analysis under Rule 703. The proper basis for
expert testimony does not depend on whether the plaintiff appears
sympathetic to the jury. If no proper basis for the testimony is
presented, a court should exclude the testimony under Rule 703.
However, if a sufficient basis for the expert's opinion is given, but
the court wishes to exclude the testimony due to fear of the jury's
118 Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1195.
121 Id.
122 Id. See supra note 3 (discussing why courts look to peer review as an indicia of
reliability).
123 Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1196-97 (citations omitted).
124 See supra note 30 (discussing the application of Rule 403 to expert testimony).
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desire to "make somebody pay," then the exclusion is only proper
under Rule 403, not Rules 403 and 703.
In further support of its decision to exclude the experts' testi-
mony under Rule 703, the Lynch court cited an earlier First Circuit
decision,1 25 Ricciardi v. Children's Hospital Medical Center.1 26  In
Ricciardi, the court invoked Rule 703 to prevent an expert from rely-
ing on an unauthenticated slip of paper in a medical record. The
plaintiff in Ricciardi, relying in part on a note found in his medical
record that indicated a mistake had been made, alleged negligence
during a surgical operation.127 The doctor who had placed the note
in the medical record had no personal knowledge of the information
nor did he recall the source of the information. t 28 The trial court
refused to allow the note into evidence either directly or as the basis
for an expert opinion.t 29 The court of appeals affirmed, noting that
"[t]he 'fact' or 'datum' on which [the expert] offered to base his
opinion was not one medical experts frequently encounter. [The
expert] said that never before had he seen such a statement in a
hospital chart."' 30
Ricciardi, much like the exclusion of the questionnaires in In re
Agent Orange,13 1 is a classic case for exclusion under Rule 703. How-
ever, the Lynch court's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The tes-
timony excluded in Lynch was in no way similar to the testimony in
Ricciardi, which relied on an unattributed statement in a medical rec-
ord, a statement that even the expert in Ricciardi had considered
"'bizarre.' "132 The Lynch court's exclusion of the expert testimony
was not for failure to reasonably rely on underlying data but rather
for failure to come to conclusions that correspond to the "scientific
consensus."' 33 Its language and findings suggest that in evaluating
an expert's testimony under Rule 703, a court can consider not only
whether the expert is basing his opinion on the sort of data upon
which his colleagues would rely, but also whether the expert is com-
ing to conclusions similar to those arrived at by his colleagues. Such
a use of Rule 703 effectively turns its reasonable reliance standard
into a scientific consensus standard. 34
125 Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1197.
126 811 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1987).
127 Id. at 20.
128 Id
129 Id. See supra note 35 (discussing use of Rule 703 to circumvent exclusionary
rules).
130 Id. at 25.
131 See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
132 Ricciardi, 811 F.2d at 25.
133 Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1195.
134 This is not to say that the testimony in question might not be excludable under
an examination of whether the experts are in fact reasonably relying on the data in ques-
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2. Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
(The D.C. Circuit)
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed this same
evidentiary issue in Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. 135 In Richardson, after the jury had returned a $1.6 million ver-
dict for the plaintiffs, the district court granted the defendant a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 36 The court of appeals af-
firmed, finding the plaintiffs' experts' testimony on causation inad-
missible under Rule 703.137
In Richardson, the plaintiffs used the same expert, Dr. Done, as
the Lynch plaintiffs had used. Dr. Done had modified his testimony
slightly, perhaps in response to the Lynch decision. In addition to
the chemical, in vivo, and in vitro studies on which he had relied in
Lynch, Dr. Done also based his opinion in Richardson on his own re-
analysis of the available epidemiological data.' 38 The court of ap-
peals found this additional basis unpersuasive, essentially because
Dr. Done had not published his analysis, 139 and all of the published
studies had found no "statistically significant association between
Bendectin and limb reduction defects of the type at issue in this
case."140
The court relied on both In re Agent Orange and Lynch in reach-
ing its conclusion. Although the court did not rely on Rule 403 to
exclude the testimony, it did take note of possible jury lawless-
tLion (i.e., would an expert in the position of Dr. Done reasonably rely on the studies he
did without also looking to the existing epidemiological studies?). However, it is diffi-
cult to see a Rule 703 problem with Dr. Swan's reliance on data obtained in a study cited
by the defendants. Furthermore, if a court found it unreasonable for Dr. Done to rely
on animal studies without considering epidemiological studies, exclusion would be more
appropriate under Rule 702 than Rule 703. See infra note 231 and accompanying text
(discussing the appropriate roles of Rules 702 and 703).
135 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989). The court de-
scribed the plaintiff's condition as follows:
[Carita Richardson's] left arm was deformed, with an underdeveloped hu-
merus fused to the radius at the elbow and terminating in a hand with
only two digits. Her right arm was normal. The right and left femurs
were underdeveloped. Her lower left leg was normal, but she had no
lower right leg at all. An appendage resembling a foot was attached to
her right hip, and later was amputated.
Id at 824 n.3.
136 Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aft'd,
857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
137 Though the court of appeals focused on Dr. Done's testimony, the plaintiffs re-
lied on seven expert witnesses. See the discussion of Richardson in Ealy v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
138 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 830.
139 See supra note 3 (discussing why courts look to peer review as an indicia of
reliability).
140 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831.
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ness. 14 1 The court also relied on the scientific nature of the evi-
dence and its effect in light of possible jury lawlessness: "The
scientific issues are complex, the trial was lengthy, and the evidence
and testimony were often difficult to understand. There was an
emotional factor at play, a circumstance we are not at liberty to
ignore."142
In reaching its decision, the Richardson court was forced to dis-
tinguish Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. ' 43 In Ferebee, the court admit-
ted the plaintiff's novel expert testimony on causation, creating a
"classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide
the victor." 144 The plaintiff in Ferebee alleged that exposure to the
defendant's herbicide had caused his lung disease, and sued the de-
fendant for failure to warn. 145 The plaintiff offered as experts two of
his treating physicians.' 46 Although these experts could offer little
in the way of conclusive studies,147 the jury found their testimony
persuasive and awarded the plaintiff $60,000 in damages.' 48 On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that the lack of scientific studies to sup-
port causation required the court to overturn the jury verdict.' 49
The court of appeals disagreed: "On questions such as these, which
stand at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry,
if experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury
to decide whether to credit such testimony."' 50
The Ferebee court clearly distinguished between scientific and
legal requirements for a finding of causation:
141 The court described its fear as follows:
The circumstances of the case are tragic and Carita Richardson's plight
evokes the utmost sympathy. It would be foolhardy to expect members
of the jury to be without compassion for the catastrophe that befell this
family. That is a natural response of the human spirit, and is without
legal consequence so long as it is properly controlled. But in a case such
as this it not only is appropriate but indeed imperative that the court re-
main vigilant to ensure that neither emotion nor confusion has sup-
planted reason.
Id. at 832. See supra text accompanying note 124 (discussing role of Rule 403 in prevent-
ing jury lawlessness).
142 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 833.
143 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
144 Id. at 1535.
145 Id. at 1532.
146 Id. at 1533. One of the experts was "truly a leading expert in the area of pulmo-
nary pathology." Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scien-
tific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 497 (1988).
147 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1533.
148 Id at 1532.
'49 Id, at 1535.
150 Id. at 1534. The court further noted that judges have no special insight into
these questions: "Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to re-
solve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-level
exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease." Id.
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[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that,
in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic
methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, ....
products liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statisti-
cally significant" number of people have been injured or until sci-
ence has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated
laboratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the test for
allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scien-
tific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could con-
clude from the expert testimony that [the herbicide] more likely
than not caused Ferebee's injury,, the fact that another jury might
reach the opposite conclusion or that science would require more
evidence before conclusively considering the causation question
resolved is irrelevant. 15 '
Essentially, the Ferebee decision distinguished between the level of
certainty required by a scientific discipline-and the level of certainty
required by a court in drawing conclusions regarding causation.152
Ferebee stands for the proposition that courts, in determining
whether a given substance more likely than not caused a plaintiff's
injury, cannot always wait for the sciences. 5 3
151 Id at 1535-36.
152 Commentators agree with this distinction. See, e.g., Robert L. Schwartz, There is
No Archbishop of Science-A Comment on Elliott's Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REv. 517, 521 (1989):
Stated another way, the confidence level necessary to make scientific re-
search useful in the courtroom may be much lower than the level neces-
sary to make it generally acceptable for scientific purposes. This is not to
say that scientific truth is better than legal truth. Rather, it is different,
because scientists and courts have different functions. A scientist may
properly decry as bad science some research that will result in good law.
153 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Courts cannot, unfortunately, wait indefinitely until all scientists have com-
pleted their long term studies. They must decide on information now available."), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
Professor Nesson agrees:
An imaginative scientist exploring the hypothesis that a given toxic agent
causes cancer is very likely to suspend scientific judgment on the ultimate
question of causation until more testing or study can be done to eliminate
alternative hypotheses. A doctor or lawyer or judge, on the other hand,
often does not have the luxury of postponing a decision. Often he must
make a judgment once he reaches a reasonable working conclusion.
Likewise, we ask juries to come to conclusions without insisting on or
waiting for scientific demonstration. The legal standard of proof would
seem to require only a rational basis for the expert's opinion-a standard
far short of scientific demonstration.
Nesson, supra note 94, at 529-30; see also Schwartz, supra note 152, at 520-21:
Scientists, working to reach generalizable and universal knowledge with-
out any externally imposed time deadline, are not willing to tolerate half-
completed research or poorly tested hypotheses. To a scientist, such re-
search is nothing more than bad science. The judicial system, however,
driven to quickly resolve matters of concern to defined parties, with res
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The Richardson court narrowly interpreted the widely noted 54
Ferebee decision: "Ferebee stands for the proposition that courts
should be very reluctant to alter a jury's verdict when the causation
issue is novel and 'stand[s] at the frontier of current medical and epidemio-
logical inquiry."-155 Finding that the study of Bendectin had been
going on for twenty years, thus placing it beyond the "frontier" of
inquiry, the Richardson court held that Ferebee was inapposite. 156
The Court of.Appeals for the D.C. Circuit cited the Richardson
decision approvingly in a 1990 Bendectin decision. In Ealy v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc.,1 57 the jury returned a judgment of $20 million
compensatory and $75 million punitive damages for the plaintiffs in
a products liability action. The trial court granted a remittitur of the
punitive damages, but denied defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 158 The court of appeals, after finding
that the Richardson decision controlled the case, reversed the trial
court and directed that court to enter a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. 159 The court held that "under Rule 703, an opinion re-
futing this scientific consensus [that Bendectin does not cause birth
defects] is inadmissible for lack of an adequate foundation .... It is
this uncontroversial rule of evidence that is the ratio decidendi of Rich-
ardson and this case."' t60 The court implied that only new studies
that had been published and refereed could pass muster under Rule
703.161
The addition of epidemiological evidence to the bases of Dr.
Done's expert opinion on causation brings into sharper focus the
proper role of Rule 703. Dr. Done now has four bases for his opin-
ion, and, unlike the testimony in Lynch, one cannot argue that it is
unreasonable to rely on the data itself. Anyone in his profession
would almost certainly acknowledge that it is reasonable to form an
judicata effects on those pardes alone and not on society as a whole, will
be better served by incomplete scientific work than by none at all.
Other circuit courts have found the Ferebee rationale persuasive. See, e.g., Osburn v.
Anchor Lab., 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); Wells
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950
(1986).
154 See, e.g., Black, supra note 6, at 671-72; Brennan, supra note 146, at 496-97; Ed-
ward T. Dangel, III, Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 1989 MASS. L. REv. 169, 173-74
("Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. is perhaps the case most often cited within the field of
toxic torts."); Farber, supra note 73, at 1236-37.
155 Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534 (emphasis
added in Richardson)).
156 Id.
157 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
158 Id. at 1159-60.
159 Id. at 1164.
160 id at 1162.
161I F,4 t l19-64
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opinion on causation based on chemical structure, animal in vivo,
animal in vitro, and epidemiological studies. The court, in actuality,
is concerned not with the bases of Done's opinions, but with his
conclusions.' 62 Those conclusions defy the scientific consensus.
Yet the language of Rule 703 does not support exclusion of expert
testimony simply because the expert arrives at a different conclusion
than many, or most, of his peers.
3. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (The Fifth Circuit)
The Fifth Circuit also used a Bendectin case to encourage
stricter scrutiny of expert scientific testimony within its jurisdiction.
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,'63 the court reversed a
$550,000 verdict against the defendant on the grounds that "the
Brocks' failure to present statistically significant epidemiological
proof that Bendectin causes limb reductioh defects [was] fatal to
their case."' 164 The court did not find the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony inadmissible, but instead found it simply insufficient to sup-
port a verdict in the face of scientific consensus to the contrary.' 65
162 One might argue that the court's true problem with Dr. Done was that he had
simply modified his testimony in response to the Lynch decision, and that his research
seemed driven by the conclusion to be reached rather than by genuine scientific inquiry.
If that were the case, the court would have been justified in excluding the testimony by
finding that Dr. Done did not qualify as an expert under Rule 702. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir.
1986), advised courts that such considerations may be taken into account in determining
whether a witness qualifies as an expert:
Trial judges must be sensitive to the qualifications of persons claiming to
be expert. Because the universe of experts is defined only by the virtually
infinite variety of fact questions in the trial courts, the signals of compe-
tence cannot be catalogued. Nevertheless, there are almost always signs
both of competence and of the contribution such experts can make to a
clear presentation of the dispute. While we leave their detection to the
good sense and instincts of the trial judges, we point by way of example
to two. First, many experts are members of the academic community who
supplement their teaching salaries with consulting work. We know from
our judicial experience that many such able persons present studies and
express opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article
submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts
subject to peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with
many others, that ought to be considered in deciding whether to accept
expert testimony. Second, the professional expert is now commonplace.
That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting with attor-
neys and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions
are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of
law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision
that he is an "expert."
163 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 15,11
(1990).
164 Brock, 884 F.2d 167, 167, modifying 874 F.2d at 313.
165 Brock, 874 F.2d at 315.
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The Brock court clearly intended to send a message with its deci-
sion. The court began by noting "a growing realization among aca-
demics, lawyers, and judges that cases such as this present special
problems and challenges to traditional ideas regarding the role of
the jury as a decisionmaker."'166 The court noted two problems
raised by these cases: first, the medical community often has not
reached a consensus on whether the substance in question causes
birth defects and second, "that juries are asked to resolve these
questions, upon which even our brightest medical minds disagree,
in order to resolve the case at hand .... and in so doing must neces-
sarily resort to speculation."' 6 7
In response to these concerns about the jury's ability to handle
toxic tort cases, the Brock court indicated that courts must be willing
to "critically evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts
connect data to their conclusions in order for courts to consistently
and rationally resolve the disputes before them."' 68 The court was
especially concerned about the danger that inconsistent jury ver-
dicts in these cases will "produce a sub-optimal amount of new drug
development" and consequently encouraged appellate courts to
take the lead in resolving these questions. 169 The court then di-
rected trial courts to be more vigilant in scrutinizing expert testi-
mony: "Hopefully, our decision will have the effect of encouraging
district judges faced with medical and epidemiologic proof in subse-
quent toxic tort cases to be especially vigilant in scrutinizing the ba-
sis, reasoning, and statistical significance of studies presented by
166 Id at 309.
167 Id
168 Id at 310.
169 Id. As further support for taking these issues from the jury, the court cited Jus-
tice Holmes:
But supposing a state of facts is often repeated in practice, is it to be
imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury for-
ever? Is it not manifest, on the contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole,
as fair a tribunal as it is represented to be, the lesson which can be got
from the source will be learned? Either the court will find that the fair
teaching of experience is that the conduct complained of usually is or is
not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained, is or is not a ground of
liability; or it will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the
necessity of making up its mind for itself.
Id. at 310 n.8 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 98 (1881)). While a cite to
Justice Holmes is to be sought after whenever possible, it may be inappropriate in this
case. In the Bendectin cases, juries have not been given the chance to oscillate, at least
not to any significant degree. They have instead been removed from the process, either
by summary judgments, directed verdicts, or judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, by
the trial and appellate courts. Note that in the Brock case, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff only to be overturned, not by the trial court, but by the court of appeals. It
is clear that the Fifth Circuit has made up its mind on this issue, but it is less clear that it
gave the jury process a chance.
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both sides."' 70 The Brock court concluded that, in future Fifth
Circuit litigation, plaintiffs cannot show that birth defects are caused
by Bendectin without a new study to support that theory of
causation. '71
The Fifth Circuit's approach to expert scientific testimony is,
perhaps, more honest than the approaches taken by the First Circuit
in Lynch and the D.C. Circuit in Richardson and Ealy. Rather than
manipulating the admissibility standard under Rule 703, the Brock
court simply found the testimony insufficient to support a reason-
able inference of causation. Its analysis went to weight rather than
admissibility.' 72 However, even though the Brock analysis may be
more honest, it is not complete, because the Federal Rules provide a
means for excluding unreliable expert testimony that meets the
standard of Rule 703.173
4. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (The Third Circuit)
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed unrelia-
ble testimony that met the standard of Rule 703 in yet another
Bendectin case, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsA.74 In DeLuca,
the court reversed the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Done's testi-
mony and grant of summary judgment for the defendant.' 75 The
court found that, at least as far as the record on summary judgment
showed, Dr. Done had reasonably relied on the same epidemiologi-
cal data on which defendant's experts had relied, thus satisfying
170 Brock, 884 F.2d at 167, modifying 874 F.2d at 315.
171 Brock, 874 F.2d at 315.
172 This is arguably where the analysis belongs. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.
15, 22 (1985) ("ITihe expert's inability to recall the basis for his opinion went to the
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility."); Gamac Grain Co. v. Blackley, 932 F.2d
1563, 1567 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Perhaps the combined weaknesses of [the expert's] meth-
odology and qualifications would lead us to discount his opinion if we werejurors. But
we are not jurors. The weaknesses in his opinion and expertise go to the weight to be
given his testimony, not its admissibility."); Quinton v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d
335, 337-38 (10th Cir. 1991) (Defendant's "challenge to the research basis for [the ex-
pert's] opinions goes to their weight, not their admissibility."); In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983) ("IT]he suggestion that the
court must, in deciding on admissibility, carefully scrutinize the underlying assumptions,
the inferences drawn, and the conclusions reached, if followed rigorously, would result
in the trial court, as distinguished from the fact-finder, deciding the weight to be given
to the testimony."), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Radio
Zenith Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Farber, supra note 73, at 1236 n.76.
173 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
174 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
175 131 F.R.D. 71 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). The court of appeals
gave less deference to the trial court because it had construed, rather than applied, Rule
703: "Our review of a district court's decision to exclude the testimony of an expert is
ordinarily limited to ensuring there has been no abuse of discretion, but to the extent
the district court's ruling turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence our
review is plenary." DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 944.
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Rule 703.176 The fact that Dr. Done had applied a different method-
ology to that data and had consequently come to a different conclu-
sion on causation than the defendant's experts did not violate Rule
703.177
The DeLuca opinion is comprehensive. The court began by set-
ting out the role epidemiology plays in proving causation in toxic
tort cases, noting that such studies only indirectly support specific
causation. 178 After carefully considering the epidemiological evi-
dence on Bendectin and Dr. Done's reanalysis of the defendant's
data using an alternative method, 179 the court considered previous
Bendectin cases excluding Dr. Done's testimony. °80 After discuss-
ing the Lynch, Richardson, and Brock decisions,18 ' the court noted that
Judge Rubin, who had overseen the original consolidated action in
Ohio that had ended in a jury verdict for the defendant, 8 2 had re-
cently denied defendant's motion for summary judgment in another
trial of consolidated Bendectin cases: 183
Judge Rubin denied the motion because he found a division in the
scientific community as to whether epidemiological evidence was
the only type of evidence that could reliably link Bendectin use to
an increased risk of birth defects, and refused to substitute his
176 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 953.
177 Id.
178 The court described the role of epidemiology as follows:
In the Bendectin context, an epidemiological study ideally attempts to
determine the incidence of birth defects among the children of two
groups of women, identical in all respects except for their use of Bendec-
tin during pregnancy. Epidemiological studies do not provide direct evi-
dence that a particular plaintiff was injured by exposure to a substance.
Id. at 945. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction be-
tween general and specific causation).
179 The court's discussion of the divergent approaches to analyzing epidemiological
data, and particularly the explanation of the lesser weight Dr. Done's approach places on
significance testing, as advocated by Dr. Kenneth Rothman of the University of Massa-
chusetts Medical School, is both beyond the scope of this Note and irrelevant to the
admissibility question posed by Rule 703. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 946-49, 953-54.
180 Id. at 949-51.
181 Id.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
183 In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990). Another
trial court also refused to grant the defendant a summary judgment based on the three
circuit court decisions. See Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp.
1117, 1120 (D. Idaho 1990):
In this case, there is no attack in the pending motions on the qualifica-
tions of plaintiffs' experts. The defendants simply want to use the over-
whelming nature of the epidemiological studies to bulldoze aside the
plaintiffs' experts. Once the epidemiological evidence is stripped of its
"overwhelming" label, does Rule 703 still preclude plaintiffs' expert tes-
timony? Only if animal studies and chemical analysis are not reasonably
relied upon by experts who attempt to investigate the connection be-
tween drugs and birth defects. And the Court cannot make such a finding
on the basis of the record before it.
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judgment for experts in the relevant fields or to decide, instead of
the jury, which view was the more reasonable. Thus he denied
Merrell Dow's assertion that the plaintiff's expert evidence, which
was based on epidemiological evidence as well as structure activity
analysis, and in vitro and in vivo studies, was inadmissible or insuf-
ficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.' 8 4
The DeLuca court acknowledged the validity of the concerns
which had led prior courts to exclude the expert testimony, includ-
ing the fear of inconsistent verdicts, 8 5 the inefficiency of repeated
trials on identical scientific questions, 8 6 the problem with experts
testifying to conclusions that have not been subjected to the rigors
of publication,8 7 and an awareness of the sympathy plaintiffs such
as those with birth defects elicit from a jury.'88 Having acknowl-
edged these concerns, the court concluded that they did not bear on
the evidentiary issues at hand:
[O]ur concern over these issues is tempered by our recognition
that we do not have the authority to create special rules to address
the problems posed by continued Bendectin litigation. Principles
of issue preclusion have not developed to the point where we may
bind plaintiffs by the finding of previous proceedings in which
they were not parties, even by a proceeding as thorough as the
multidistrict common issues trial. Moreover, we may not manipulate
our interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude expert testi-
mony that on the record before us may satisfy normal standards of
admissibility. 189
Proceeding to the specific question of admissibility under Rule
703, the court found that the district court's ruling was "cursory"
and "not predicated upon a record-supported, factual finding that
Done relied upon identified data not regarded as reliable by experts
in the field,"' 9 as required by the Third Circuit's holding in Japanese
Electronic Products. '9'
184 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 951.
185 Id
186 Id at 951-52.
187 Id. at 952.
188 Id
189 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
190 Id at 953.
191 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub norm. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). See supra note 34.
The district court had also dismissed Done's epidemiological reanalysis because he
was not an epidemiologist. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 953. The court of appeals found this
dismissal erroneous not only because the defendant had conceded Dr. Done's qualifica-
tions to interpret the data, but also because Rule 702, not Rule 703, governs expert
qualification. "Given the liberal criteria that governs the expertness inquiry.... it is
doubtful whether an expert with Dr. Done's credentials could be preduded from testify-
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In addition, the appellate court held that the trial court's reli-
ance on previous judicial exclusion of Dr. Done's testimony was in-
appropriate, not only because it was an impermissible use of issue
preclusion, 192 but also because "these prior judicial opinions ... do
not address the question of whether reasonable experts would rely
upon the epidemiological data Dr. Done bases his opinion on."193
Instead, the other opinions had looked to the conclusions that Dr.
Done had drawn from the data in the face of overwhelming contrary
scientific opinion. The court found the conclusions of the other epi-
demiological studies irrelevant to the analysis under Rule 703:
Rule 703 is satisfied once there is a showing that an expert's testi-
mony is based on the type of data a reasonable expert in the field
would use in rendering an opinion on the subject at issue; it does
not address the reliability or general acceptance of an expert's
methodology. When a statistician refers to a study as "not statisti-
cally significant," he is not making a statement about the reliabil-
ity of the data used, rather he is making a statement about the
propriety of drawing a particular inference from that data.' 94
Having found the data admissible under Rule 703 as data upon
which an expert would reasonably rely, the court of appeals then
addressed how the reliability of an expert's methodology affects ad-
missibility. Relying on United States v. Downing, a previous Third Cir-
cuit decision, 195 the court found that "Rule 702's helpfulness
requirement implicitly contains the proposition that expert testi-
mony that is based on unreliable methodology is unhelpful and
therefore excludable."' 196 The Downing court proposed the follow-
ing test for determining if an expert's testimony is based on an un-
reasonable methodology and hence excludable:
Rule 702 requires that a district court ruling upon the admission
of (novel) scientific evidence, i.e. evidence whose scientific funda-
ments are not suitable candidates for judicial notice, conduct a
preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and reliability
of the process or technique used in generating the evidence, (2)
the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm, con-
ing about his interpretation of epidemiological evidence simply because he does not
have a degree in epidemiology." Id.
192 See supra text accompanying note 189.
193 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 953.
194 Id.
195 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). Downing rejected the "general acceptance" test of
admissibility for novel scientific evidence, originally set out in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), "for among other reasons, because the general acceptance test
was too vague and malleable to yield consistent results, and because its nose-counting
emphasis often led to the exclusion of helpful evidence in contradiction to the spirit of
the Federal Rules of Evidence." DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 955. See also infra note 220.
196 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954.
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fuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection be-
tween the scientific research or test result to be presented, and
particular disputed factual issues in the case.197
Based on Downing, the DeLuca court refused to exclude Dr. Done's
testimony on the record before it. Instead, the DeLuca court re-
manded the case and directed the trial court to consider the reliabil-
ity of Dr. Done's methodology under Rule 702 should the defendant
choose to challenge Dr. Done's testimony on remand.198
C. Frye Resurrected: Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.
Whatever degree of clarity the Third Circuit brought to Rules
702 and 703 in DeLuca was shattered by the Fifth Circuit's most re-
cent pronouncements on scientific expert testimony in Christophersen
v. Allied-Signal Corp. 199 In Christophersen, the court of appeals sitting
en banc affirmed the district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's ex-
pert testimony and consequently affirmed the grant of summary
judgment. In so doing, the per curiam opinion not only "judicially
amend[ed] the Federal Rules of Evidence," 200 but also reversed the
previous panel's restriction of the holding in Brock to Bendectin
cases, or their like.201
In Christophersen, plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action al-
leging that decedent's colon cancer-a small-cell carcinoma-had
been caused by workplace exposure to toxic nickel and cadmium
fumes. 20 2 Despite a lack of epidemiological studies to support his
postion, the plaintiffs' expert witness offered to testify that exposure
to nickel and cadmium had caused decedent's colon cancer.203
While epidemiological studies support the carcinogenicity of nickel
and cadmium,20 4 apparently no studies tie nickel and cadmium spe-
cifically to colon cancer, though no studies rule out such a relation-
ship either.20 5 In short, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could
197 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
198 The court of appeals further noted that "if Done's testimony survives the rigors
of Rules 702 and 703 on remand, Rule 403 is an unlikely basis for exclusion." DeLuca,
911 F.2d at 957. But c. supra note 30 (discussing the interplay of Rules 702, 703 and
403).
199 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
200 Id. at 1137 (King, J., dissenting).
201 See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1990),
superseded by 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
202 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1108.
203 l at 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting). The principal dissenting opinion provides
the most factual detail from the record below. Id. at 1119 (Clark, CJ., concurring in the
result).
204 Id at 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
205 See id at 1127 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
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look to epidemiology for support. Instead, the plaintiffs' expert re-
lied on the following data:
the carcinogenicity of nickel and cadmium and their capacity to
reach the colon; the unique characteristics of small-cell carcinoma
and its relative rarity in the colon; the linkage of small-cell carci-
noma to toxins such as nickel and cadmium; and the genetic-alter-
ation mechanism associated with both small-cell carcinoma and
nickel and cadmium. 20 6
The district court found this basis insufficient, under a mistaken
view of Rule 703.207 Following the trend established in In re Agent
Orange and the Bendectin cases, the district court applied Rule 703
to the expert's methodology. 208 Despite the court's mistaken appli-
cation of Rule 703-an application that even the per curiam opinion
fails to endorse2 9-the court of appeals found that the district court
had not abused its discretion in excluding the testimony.210
Rather than rely on Rule 703 to impugn the expert's methodol-
ogy, the per curiam opinion relies on an innovative application of
the much-maligned 2 11 Frye test.212 Though the district court made
no mention of Fye in its exclusion of the testimony,213 the majority
found that "the district court was within its discretion in concluding,
albeit implicitly, that [the expert's] testimony failed to meet . .. the
Frye test."21 4 Not only does the court of appeals introduce the Frye
analysis sua sponte, but the analysis itself is without precedent. 21 5
206 I at 1127-28 (Reavley, J., dissenting); see also id at 1133-34 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
207 Id at 1129-30 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
208 IM at 1129 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
209 The per curiam opinion makes no mention of methodology in its discussion of
Rule 703. See id. at 1113-15. It saves its discussion of methodology for its resurrected
Frye analysis. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
210 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 ("The district court in this case did not abuse its
discretion."); id. at 1116 ("The district court's ruling that [the expert's] opinion was
inadmissible was not manifestly erroneous.").
211 See id at 1132 n.41 (Reavley, J., dissenting). Though Fye has been subject to
widespread criticism, Judge Reavley did note that "the Fifth Circuit has never joined the
chorus of Fye detractors." Id. at 1132 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
212 As discussed supra note 195, the Fye test, also known as the general acceptance
test, originated with the D.C. Circuit's decision by that name of almost 70 years ago.
Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
- I aChristophersen, 939 F.2d at 1133 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
214 Id at 1116 (emphasis added).
215 Id at 1132 (Reavley, J., dissenting). The application and merits of the Frye test
are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this Note. It is not possible to ignore, how-
ever, the degree to which the majority in Christophersen ignored reality in stating that it
was "introduc[ing] no new concepts to [its] jurisprudence." Id. at 1110. Application of
Frye to a run-of-the-mill civil case is unquestionably a new concept. As Judge Reavley
indicates in dissent, the Fifth Circuit had previously placed significant limits on the ap-
plication of Frye: "We have only once employed Frye outside the criminal context, never
applied it to 'reasoning,' and indeed once expressly limited the Frye doctrine to 'pseudo-
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Though the Fifth Circuit fails "to light the path district courts
should follow in ruling on expert opinion evidence"-"the very rea-
son the court took the case en banc" 216-the four opinions further
the analysis of expert testimony under the Federal Rules nonethe-
less. Though only the concurrence and dissents assert with clarity
that Rule 703 does not apply to an expert's methodology,2 17 even
the majority opinion fails to endorse the district court's mistaken
application of Rule 703.2 18 While the Christophersen opinion will cre-
ate havoc of its own,219 its resurrection of the Frye test does less
violence, in a sense, to the plain language of Rule 703.220 None of
the four appellate opinions endorses the district court's application
of Rule 703. This may be a minor step forward given the backward-
scientific data.' Until today, we soundly limited the Fye doctrine to particular tech-
niques, 'novel scientific evidence,' that reflect the factual context of Fye." Id at 1133
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
216 Id at 1116 (Clark, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
217 Id. at 1118 (Clark, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id at 1129 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting); see id at 1136 (King, J., dissenting).
218 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
219 See Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1136 (King, J., dissenting):
The juxtaposition of the majority opinion and the record in this case
sends a clear message to the district courts in this circuit. Henceforth, a
dispute among qualified experts as to the appropriate scientific method-
ology or reasoning that an expert in the particular field should use to
connect the facts to his conclusions is to be resolved by the district judge.
220 Resurrection of the Frye test may, however, be inconsistent with the liberal ad-
missibility standards of the Federal Rules. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 26,
702[03], at 702-36 ("Elimination of the Frye test is consistent with the underlying poli-
cies of Article VII."); i at 702-44. Weinstein and Berger argue further that "Rule 702's
failure to incorporate a general scientific acceptance standard, and the Advisory Com-
mittee Note's failure to even mention the Fye case must be considered significant. The
silence of the rule and its drafters may arguably be regarded as tantamount to an aban-
donment of the general acceptance standard." Id at 702-36.
Professor Imwinkelried relies in addition on Rule 402, arguing that because Frye
was not codified, it can no longer be good law:
The omission of [the expression "general acceptance"] from Article VII
becomes all the more important in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
That rule generally provides that logically relevant evidence is admissible
unless there is a basis for exclusion in the Constitution, a statute, or a
court rule promulgated pursuant to statutory authority. While the rule
expressly refers to the Constitution, statutes, and court rules adopted
under statutory authority, there is no mention of caselaw as a source of
law. As a general proposition, Rule 402 sweeps away common-law re-
strictions which Congress failed to codify in the Federal Rules.... Frye is
purely a creature of caselaw. Since the rule was not codified in Article
VII, the rule is no longer good law.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the American Test for the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 30 MED., Sm. & L. 60, 63 (1990). Even the United States government has taken
this position. See United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The
government urges that Rule 702 creates a liberal rule of admissibility which now super-
sedes Fye ....").
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looking introduction of Frye to the analysis of expert testimony in
civil cases, 221 but it is a step forward nonetheless.222
III
ANALYSIS
At least two types of jurisprudential arguments can be made
about any rule: the first is whether the rule should be as it is; given
the rule as it is, the second argument is whether the rule should be
enforced as it exists. Many commentators have addressed whether,
and if so, how, greater control should be exerted over expert testi-
mony.223 As noted in the introduction, despite widespread agree-
ment on the need for greater control, little consensus has been
reached on the means to achieve that end.22 4 Perhaps as a result,
Rules 702 and 703 have not yet been legislatively amended to deal
with the problems of toxic torts. This Note addresses the second
221 The application of Frye, or at least the underlying premise of Frye, in criminal
cases has been eloquently defended by Professor Gianelli. See Paul C. Gianelli, The Ad-
missibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 1197, 1246, 1250 (1980).
222 Given the split in the circuits on the admissibility of expert testimony under
Rules 702 and 703 and the continuing questions regarding Frye's viability in light of the
Federal Rules, Christophersen's holding may not be long-lived. The time may be ripe for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on these issues. See Gary Taylor, Expert Witness
Opinion Eyed, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3, 35. Justice White has already indicated his
interest in granting certiorari to resolve the circuit split over Frye. Mustafa v. United
States, 479 U.S. 953, 953 (1986) (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
223 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with
the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32
ARiz. L. REV. 915, 971 (1990) (calling for courts to test proffered evidence on three
levels of reliability); Kimberly S. Moore, Comment, Exploring the Inconsistencies of Scrutiniz-
ing Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 885, 899-900
& n. 115 (199 1) (calling for mandatory use of court-appointed experts in "indeterminate
cases"); Anne S. Tokar, Comment, Admitting Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 15
HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 165, 166 (1991) (arguing that "the task of assessing scientific testi-
mony should not be taken away from jurors").
224 Though many possible changes have been proposed by commentators, see supra
note 6, a recent proposal by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
suggests that reform may actually be gaining momentum. The proposed changes, circu-
lated to the bench and bar by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States on August 15, 1991, would require expert testi-
mony admitted under Rule 702 to be "reasonably reliable" and to "substantially assist
the trier of fact." COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 83 (199 1) (circulated for public com-
ment) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]. Though the proposal unquestionably re-
stricts the admission of expert testimony, the Committee explicitly rejects reading the
change as a return to the general acceptance standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra, at 84. In any event, the change
would, as this Note argues should be the case, exert greater control over expert testi-
mony through Rule 702 rather than Rule 703.
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question: given existing Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703,
should those rules be enforced as enacted, to apply in the same fash-
ion across the entire spectrum of civil cases? Before answering this
question, one must define the rules as enacted. Accordingly, this
Part first argues that the approach to Rules 702 and 703 taken by
the Third Circuit in DeLuca is most consistent with the rules as en-
acted. This Part then describes some of the confusion, on the part
of courts and commentators alike, that has resulted from this blur-
ring of Rules 702 and 703. Finally, this Part briefly argues that the
rules should be enforced as enacted in order to promote predictabil-
ity in decision-making and clarity in reform discussions.
Though the answer to the question may seem obvious at first
glance (i.e., of course one should apply the rules as enacted), the
movement by several courts of appeals to apply the rules more re-
strictively in toxic tort cases, and the corresponding move by at least
one state court to apply a less restrictive standard to toxic tort
cases,225 indicates that the answer is not self-evident.
A. No Justification for Judicially Expanding Rule 703 to
Methodology
Nothing in Rule 703 justifies extending its scope from the facts
underlying an expert opinion to the methodology employed in
forming an opinion based on those facts.226 This is, however, what
the In re Agent Orange court appears to have done. "Though the
225 That state is New Jersey, which has a rule of evidence that combines Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747
(N.J. 1991). In Rubanick, the Supreme Court of NewJersey explicitly granted parties in
toxic tort litigation wide latitude in proving causation:
[T]oxic-tort litigation does not frequently encounter well-established and
widely-accepted scientific theories of causation that can, at the level de-
manded by the scientific method, precisely delineate the causal path be-
tween the toxin and the pathology. Nevertheless, in such litigation there
is often available data and information of a type that is used and relied on
by experts in the field; further, there are reputable and highly qualified
experts who, drawing on such data and information, have the proficiency
to apply sound scientific methods sufficient to reach creditable opinions
with respect to causation. We are thus strongly persuaded that a stan-
dard that accounts for those considerations should be employed to deter-
mine the reliability of expert opinion testimony relating to causation in
toxic-tort litigation.
Accordingly, we hold that in toxic-tort litigation, a scientific theory of
causation that has not yet reached general acceptance may be found to be
sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific
methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably re-
lied on by experts in the scientific field.
Id at 747-48.
226 At least one commentator argues with the proposition that Rule 703 even applies
to an expert's reliance on data such as scientific studies and reports, leaving Rule 702 to
regulate such reliance and limiting Rule 703's application to "the specific facts of the
pending case." Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 6-7. For a view at the opposite extreme,
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court [in In re Agent Orange] obviously understood the deficiencies in
how the experts had reached their conclusions, it framed its decision
in terms of the bases upon which the experts relied .... [Its articu-
lated rationale tends to confuse the facts relied upon with the conclusions based
on those facts."227
The In re Agent Orange court, by failing to clarify that it was ex-
cluding the experts' opinions because the bases for their opinions,
not their conclusions, were problematic, opened the door for courts
to improperly extend the analysis under Rule 703 from the facts un-
derlying an expert's opinion to the expert's methodology. Shortly
after In re Agent Orange, the Lynch court used the In re Agent Orange
case in this manner:
The court in Agent Orange excluded the proffered opinion evidence
because the data supporting it could not reasonably be relied
upon by experts in the field. In Lynch the data utilized by the
plaintiffs' experts, including interview forms and medical histo-
ries, had been developed by the defendants' experts and was relia-
ble. Plaintiffs' experts had reviewed the data carefully and had
reached different conclusions than had the defendants' experts.
The court's criticism was not of the data, but of the experts' analy-
sis. The Lynch court's reliance on Rule 703 therefore seems
misplaced.228
Both the Brock court and the Richardson court relied on Lynch and In
re Agent Orange to similarly extend the Rule 703 analysis.
The DeLuca court was the first to carefully examine how earlier
courts had applied Rule 703. It determined that the application of
Rule 703 to an expert's methodology-thereby requiring an opinion
supported by scientific consensus-was unwarranted.
On the remand of Deluca, the district court could exclude Dr.
Done's testimony, but if the district judge decided to exclude the
testimony, he would have to do so under Rule 702. The ability to
exclude Dr. Done's testimony under Rule 702, either under a Down-
ing reliability analysis 229 or by a determination that Dr. Done did not
see ChiefJudge Clark's concurrence in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1118-19 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
227 Black, supra note 6, at 676 (emphasis added).
Despite the way the In re Agent Orange court framed its decision, it is certainly argua-
ble that the exclusion under Rule 703 in In re Agent Orange was justified, because the
plaintiffs' experts had attempted to create their own study via the excluded question-
naires and had admitted that the other studies they relied upon were "not persuasive."
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). There was no basis,
according to judge Weinstein, on which the experts could reasonably rely in drawing an
inference of causation between Agent Orange and the various ailments complained of.
See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. But see Brennan, supra note 69, at 56.
228 Dangel, supra note 154, at 172.
229 See supra text accompanying note 195.
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meet expert qualifications, 230 supports restriction rather than ex-
pansion of Rule 703's application. Since the court could exclude
the problem testimony under accepted application of Rule 702,231 it
is both unnecessary and inadvisable to expand the application of
Rule 703.
B. Need for Clarity on Roles of Rules 702 and 703
The need for a dear exposition of Rules 702 and 703 is mani-
fest.23 2 Both courts and commentators233 confuse the two rules by
applying one rule where the other rule applies. Judge Becker, when
sitting on the district court level, acknowledged the difficulty in de-
termining the appropriate rule for the admissibility analysis, stating
that "it is not immediately obvious whether the inquiry should pro-
ceed under F.R.E. 702, 703, or 403."'2 3 Since elevated to the Third
Circuit, Judge Becker again acknowledged this difficulty in a recent
opinion:
230 See supra note 162.
231 In discussing methods of excluding expert testimony under the Federal Rules,
Judge Weinstein himself approved of this use of Rule 702:
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge can exclude expert testi-
mony and thus grant summary judgment in one of two ways. First there
is Rule 703, which allows an expert to base his opinion on the type of
evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. In some cases
examination of the basis of an expert's opinion reveals that it is sup-
ported by no reliable evidence at all. In such cases exclusion of the ex-
pert's opinion under Rule 703 and a grant of summary judgment to the
opposing party might be appropriate. In other cases, an expert's opinion
is supported by some credible evidence, but further investigation reveals
that there is other, much more persuasive evidence available which un-
dermines the expert's opinion and which the expert is ignoring. In these
cases, the court might exclude the expert's testimony either under Rule
702, as not being helpful to the trier of fact, or under Rule 403, as being
likely to mislead the jury.
Jack Weinstein, Role of Expert Testimony and Novel Scientific Evidence in Proof of
Causation 30-31 (Aug. 9, 1987) (address before the ABA Annual Meeting) (footnotes
omitted), quoted in Elliott, supra note 1, at 496 n.40; see Rothstein & Crew, supra note 40,
at 20 (describing objection to be made under Rule 702).
232 See Imwinkelried, supra note 18, 3-6.
233 Commentators' differing approaches to Rules 702 and 703 are clearest in their
discussions of whether the Frye test survived the enactment of the Federal Rules. See
Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 6; Randolph N.Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning,
and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 Txx. L. Rv. 745, 764-65 & n.88 (1990).
Even editors of case reporters have confused the proper roles of Rules 702 and 703.
See headnote 4 to DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 942, which cites Rule 703 in the place of Rule 702
("Expert testimony based on unreliable methodology is unhelpful and therefore exclud-
able under rule authorizing admission of testimony which is rendered by qualified ex-
pert and is helpful to the trier of fact. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 703, 28 U.S.C.A.").
234 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1333 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), rev'd sub nom. In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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We begin... with the frank recognition that the determination
whether expert testimony depends on a reliable "scientific tech-
nique," to be analyzed under Rule 702, or whether the basis for
testimony is "facts or data.., of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field," to be analyzed under Rule 703,....
is ofttimes subtle if not strained. It can be difficult to determine
whether the putative problem with scientific evidence lies in the
underlying data itself or the method by which the data is
analyzed. 28 5
Appellate courts have difficulty analyzing the admissibility of
expert testimony both because they frequently confuse Rules 702
and 703,236 and because trial courts fail to indicate precisely why
they are excluding testimony.23 7 The two problems are related;
given the confusion surrounding Rules 702 and 703, it is not sur-
prising that a trial court would exclude expert testimony without
dearly specifying which rule supported the exclusion.
In addition to simply making appellate review of evidentiary de-
cisions difficult, the lower courts' confusion has led to decisions that
can only be explained as misunderstandings. Cases construing the
Brock decision provide good examples. In Brock, the Fifth Circuit
found Dr. Done's testimony admissible but insufficient to support
an inference of causation. 23 8 In the course of reaching its decision,
however, the Brock court directed lower courts to scrutinize expert
testimony more carefully.23 9 The district court in Thomas v. Hoffman-
235 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting FED.
R. EvID. 703), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); see also Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp.,
593 A.2d 733, 747 (N.J. 1991) (noting difficulty in separating the analyses and preferring
single analysis made possible by state evidentiary rule).
236 See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
237 The district court in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation was guilty of such a fail-
ure. 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). Plaintiffs, who lived near a railroad's storage area for
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a Superfund site, brought suit alleging personal in-
jury from exposure. Id at 361. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, but in
reviewing the excluded testimony, the court was forced to guess on what grounds the
lower court had ruled: "Although it stops short of giving the basis for a number of its
rulings, the district court appears to have found that much of plaintiffs' expert opinion
evidence.., was unreliable and excludable under Rule 703." In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853
(emphasis added).
Difficulty of review may also lead directly to unpredictability, though not all com-
mentators would consider this a problem. Professor Mengler argues that "the drafters
did not intend for the appellate courts to become rulemakers themselves by establishing
binding precedents that narrow or focus the Federal Rules' general language." Thomas
M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IowA L. REv. 413,
458 (1989). It is not the role of the appellate courts to increase the predictability or
clarity of application of the rules, he argues; rather, "the appellate court's proper role
under the Federal Rules is limited to checking the trial's overall fairness." Id.
238 See supra text accompanying note 165.
239 See supra text accompanying note 170.
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La Roche, Inc. 2 4 0 followed the Brock court's advice. In Thomas, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's drug, prescribed to treat acne,
had caused neurological problems. After the jury had returned a
verdict of one million dollars for the plaintiff, the trial court granted
ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing Brock.24 1 The Thomas
court found insufficient evidence to support an inference of causa-
tion solely because of the lack of epidemiological evidence to sup-
port causation, even though no epidemiological evidence denied
causation either.242 Thomas takes Brock to an almost unimaginable
extreme in that it effectively requires plaintiffs to present epidemio-
logical evidence of causation even if no epidemiological studies exist
that support the defendant's theory of causation.243
Not only have cases such as Thomas been erroneously decided,
but lower courts in other circuits have used Brock to exclude expert
testimony under Rule 703.244 For example, in Renaud v. Martin
Marietta Corp. ,245 the district court cited Brock in support of its ruling
that the expert testimony offered by plaintiffs, who had alleged in-
jury due to contaminated water, was inadmissible because of a lack
of epidemiological support.246 The court did not go so far as to
require epidemiological evidence in all toxic tort cases, but it did
require it in those cases where it was possible to collect such evi-
dence. 247 Since this case involved a community alleging contamina-
tion of its water supply, the court determined that it would be
possible to conduct an epidemiological study.2 48 Because plaintiffs'
experts offered no such study to support their opinions on causa-
240 731 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989).
241 Id- at 227-28 ("[Brock provides] that a plaintiff in a prescription drug product
liability case must present statistically significant epidemiological proof.").
242 "The court notes that there is a total absence of any statistically significant study
to assist the jury in its determination of the issues of causation." Id. at 228 (emphasis
added).
243 In the In re Agent Orange and Bendectin cases, epidemiological studies existed that
supported the defendants' position on causation. The courts found plaintiffs' expert
testimony insufficient in that there was no epidemiological evidence to support causa-
tion, not because there was no epidemiological evidence whatsoever.
244 Both the previous case and the case that follows in the text do not involve
Bendectin. These cases are used to indicate that the rulings on Bendectin have affected
expert testimony outside of the Bendectin context. That Brock has resulted in erroneous
applications of Rule 703 involving Bendectin is less surprising. See, e.g., Lee v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., No. 84-2228GB, 1991 WL 166316 (W.D. Tenn.Jan. 20 1991) (exclud-
ing expert testimony on Bendectin under Rules 702-703); Turpin v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. -1990) (excluding expert testimony on
Bendectin under Rule 703).
245 749 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Colo. 1990).
246 Id. at 1554.
247 Id. "Collection of such evidence is possible in situations where an identifiable
exposure population is large enough to perform a meaningful epidemiological study."
Id
248 Id
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tion, the court found their testimony inadmissible under Rule 703.
In describing its role in evaluating expert testimony under Rule 703,
the court found that "[a] court must make a preliminary determina-
tion as to whether the methodology employed by an expert is of a type
normally relied upon by experts in that field before the expert's
opinion may be presented to a jury."249
The cases highlight the problems that arise when courts are un-
certain how to apply Rules 702 and 703 to expert testimony.250 The
problem with the expert testimony in the Bendectin cases was not a
lack of epidemiological evidence, since over twenty years' worth of
studies existed. Rather, the plaintiffs' expert had used an unrelia-
ble2_5 1 methodology in evaluating the epidemiological data. If the
Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits had been
clear on this point, then much of the current controversy over
whether epidemiological data is a prerequisite to a toxic tort suit
would probably not arise in the context of evidentiary rulings. Evi-
dentiary rulings do not appear to be the proper place to resolve that
question. If courts dearly understand and apply the existing rules
of evidence, courts and commentators could clearly and cogently
discuss such policy questions as whether to allow experts to testify
to causation in toxic tort cases without epidemiological support.
C. The Role of Rules in Law
Beyond the benefit to policy discussions regarding reform of
the rules and to discussions of topics such as an expert's reliance on
epidemiology, a strong jurisprudential argument can be made that
rules should be enforced as enacted. That argument rests on the
need for predictability in the law and limits on the court's role in
interpreting statutes.
The need for predictability in the law is rather basic. As Justice
Scalia has noted, "Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to
249 Id. at 1548 (emphasis added).
250 These problems may stem less from a misunderstanding of the rules of evidence
than from a misunderstanding of scientific principles. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, at
496 ("[t]he root of the problem is that one cannot reduce what constitutes 'good sci-
ence' to a simple formula that judges, who generally know nothing about science, can
apply"); see also supra note 150. While it may be the case that judges and lawyers lack a
proper understanding of science, see generally Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or 'Jurs-
aence"?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 525, 538 (1984) (suggesting a revision of the science
and prelaw curricula to remedy the problem), that fact in no way lessens the need for
judges to have a clear understanding of the rules.
251 The DeLuca court found that, on the record before it, Dr. Done's testimony met
the standards set forth in Downing and was therefore admissible. However, the court
allowed the defendants to challenge the expert's methodology on remand. DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes. '252
One looks, then, to the rules of evidence to know what the law
prescribes. When those rules prescribe that they will apply in all
cases in the federal courts, 253 it follows that a given rule should not
be applied differently to toxic tort cases than to other cases.
Although one might argue that policy suggests differing rules,
courts should not arbitrarily apply a rule of general applicability in a
different fashion as a means to achieve those policy objectives. 254
Professors Atiyah and Summers argue that those subject to the rules
should want precisely the contrary:
[A person] cannot know precisely what is expected of him if the
rules are readily modifiable in the light of substantive reasons
which may be relevant when they come to be applied to his case.
He may, to be sure, want to see those reasons and policies avail-
able for debate and reform in a process to which he has some
access; but in the meantime, he will prefer to know what the rules
are with some certainty .... The demand for.. . clarity and
proper enforcement of the rules ... is thus more likely to come
from the ruled themselves than from officials who wish to wield
power.255
The limit on a court's role in interpreting rules arises from the
Supreme Court's recent imposition of "the plain-meaning standard
of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence. '25 6
Although the plain-meaning standard has its faults,257 it furthers the
same relationship between the courts and legislatures as does pre-
dictability. The courts should enforce the rule the legislature
passed (in this case, proposed by the Court itself), and arguments
for reform should be raised in a place to which parties have some
access, as Atiyah and Summers put it-in the Rules Committee or a
legislature.258
252 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rule, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179
(1989).
253 See FED. R. EvID. 101, 1101. Application of the rules in criminal cases may be
limited by the Constitution. See supra note 16.
254 Courts have rejected similar arguments regarding expert testimony in other con-
texts. See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1241 (8th Cir.) (holding that
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is -admissible on behalf of the prosecu-
tion as well as the defense), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 312 (1991).
255 P.S. ATrIAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAw 73 (1987).
256 Jonakait, supra note 233, at 745.
257 See id at 747-49.
258 It is useful to note that even proponents of change such as Vice President Quayle
and the Council on Competitiveness do not argue that courts should undertake these
changes themselves. See Bork, supra note 1, at 17-18 ("The proposals would be imple-
mented by state and federal legislation, by amendments to the Federal Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence and through administrative actions, including attorney general
directives and presidential orders.").
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CONCLUSION
Whether to allow expert testimony in toxic tort cases without
epidemiological support is only one of many policy questions that
courts must address in determining how and to what degree to
"take hold of expert testimony." 259 Courts will be better able to
address these policy questions by conscientiously applying the Fed-
eral Rules. Although changes to the rules have been proposed,260
the courts should not rely on such proposals to clarify the rules that
are now in place.261
In DeLuca, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made a
substantial contribution towards an increased understanding of the
relationship between Rules 702 and 703.262 Rule 703 restricts only
the facts or data on which an expert may rely in forming an opinion;
it does not restrict the range of conclusions the expert may draw
from that data. Experts who use unreliable methodologies in form-
ing their opinions are not helpful to the jury, and their testimony
should consequently be excluded under Rule 702. Application of
Rule 703 to an expert's methodology restricts the range of possible
conclusions to only those that meet the scientific consensus. Relia-
ble, and therefore helpful, opinions may be excluded if Rule 703 is
applied to an expert's methodology. Such an application of Rule
703 is contrary to both the language and spirit of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
Michael C. McCarthyt
259 In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
260 See supra note 224 (noting proposed change to Rule 702).
261 In fact, changes in the rules might only confuse matters for another twenty years.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 23 ("[W]e have had almost two decades of experience
working with rules 702 and 703. Yet .... to date the courts have failed to clarify the
relationship between the two statutes. That failure is intolerable." (footnote omitted)).
262 Speaking of the DeLuca decision, Professor Martin has noted that "[t]he Third
Circuit has certainly gone further than any other circuit in attempting to articulate a
standard of admissibility appropriate to the judicial forum and reflecting the apparent
goals of Rules 702 and 703." Michael Martin, Issues About Experts in Toxic Tort Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 1991, at 3, 4. The DeLuca and In re Paoli decisions are already having
an effect. See Cherico v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 758 F. Supp. 258, 259-63 (E.D.
Pa. 1991); Peterson v. Sealed Air Corp., Nos. 86 C 3498, 88 C 9859, 1991 WL 66370, at
*6-10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1991).
t The author would like to thank Professor Faust Rossi of the Cornell Law School
for the inspiration for this Note and for his guidance of the author's thinking on the
subject. The opinions expressed, and any mistaken assumptions involved, are, of
course, the author's own.
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